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Being treated fairly by others is an important need in everyday life. Experimentally,
fairness can be studied using the Ultimatum Game, where the decision to reject a low,
but non-zero offer is seen as a way to punish the other player for an unacceptable
offer. The canonical explanation of such behavior is inequity aversion: people prefer
equal outcomes over personal gains. However, there is abundant evidence that people’s
decision to reject a low offer can be changed by contextual factors and their emotional
state, which cannot be explained by the inequity aversion model. Here, we expand a
recent alternative explanation: rejections are driven by deviations from expectations: the
larger the difference between the actual offer and the expected offer, the more likely one is
to reject the offer. Specifically, we provided participants with explicit information on what
kind of offers to expect using histograms depicting distribution of offers given in a previous
experiment by the same proposers. Crucially, we showed four different distributions,
manipulating both the mean and the variance of these expected sets of offers. We
found that 50% of our participants clearly and systematically changed their behavior
as a function of their expectations (11% followed the standard-economic model of
pure self-interest and 39% where not distinguishable from the inequity-aversion model).
Using a logistic mixed-model analysis, we found that the mean and variance differently
affect the decision to reject an offer. Specifically, the mean expected offer affected the
threshold of what offers are acceptable, while the expected variance of offers changed
how strict participants were about this threshold. Together, these results suggest that
social expectations have a more complex nature as current theories propose.
Keywords: decision making, social, fairness, expectations, Ultimatum Game
1. INTRODUCTION
Human societies thrive largely due to our ability to construct, and then adhere to, social norms,
which can be thought of as shared expectations as to how we should behave toward each other.
When people deviate from these norms, we are typically willing to punish transgressors, even if it
comes at a personal cost (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). A key question therefore is what motivates us
to punish in such situations. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a well-studied task that has been used
to examine such decisions experimentally (Güth et al., 1982). In this simple two-player game, the
first player, usually deemed the Proposer, is allocated a sum of money and must make an offer to a
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second player, termed the Responder, as to how that money
should be split. Then, the Responder decides to either accept
or reject that offer. If accepted, the money is split as had been
proposed; if rejected, however, both players get nothing. Results
in this game are highly reliable—importantly, low offers, that is
around 10–20% of the total amount, are typically perceived as
unfair and are rejected more than half of the time (Camerer,
2003).
From a perspective of pure economic self-interest, it is
irrational to reject any non-zero offer, as any amount of money
should be preferred to receiving nothing at all. The canonical
explanation of why people reject low offers is inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), which proposes that we monitor
the payoffs for ourselves and others, and that any deviation
from equality leads to dissatisfaction. Specifically, the inequity
aversion account of the Responder’s decision to accept or reject
an unfair (but non-zero) offer represents this decision as a trade-
off between a monetary gain (positive utility) on the one hand,
and inequality (negative utility) on the other. Across individuals
the relative balance of these two aspects will differ, but once
the dissatisfaction of the inequality reaches a certain level, the
Responder will forgo the money and reject the unfair proposal
(of course leading to no gain for the Proposer as well). Note that
inequity aversion can account for some contextual factors which
have been shown to affect Responders willingness to accept low
offers. For example, after having worked for the right to be the
Proposer, players typically make lower offers, and these offers are
in turn accepted at a higher rate by the Responder, presumably
because people perceive an equitable allocation of money as one
that is also proportional to the relative inputs (Hoffman et al.,
1996).
However, despite the compelling inequity aversion account,
both behavioral (Sanfey, 2009) and neuroimaging studies (Chang
and Sanfey, 2013; Xiang et al., 2013) have clearly shown that
people also adapt their decisions based on what kind of offers
they expect. That is, their expectations of what they will
receive can play a large role in their subsequent decisions. For
example, when players expect to see low offers, they are in turn
more likely to accept these low offers than when their prior
expectations were higher. Crucially, this cannot be accounted
for by inequity aversion—no change between inputs exists across
these scenarios, as the relevant expectations are independent of
the actions of the Proposer. Therefore, an alternative explanation
has been proposed, namely that instead of deriving disutility from
a deviation from equal payoffs, people instead take deviations
from prior expectations into account. An initial empirical study
of this effect (Sanfey, 2009) demonstrated that participants who
had been led to believe that offers would be fair (so-called
“high expectations” group) rejected offers at a significantly higher
rate than another group of players who had been told that
offers would be unfair (“low expectations” group), despite both
groups seeing an identical set of offers. Follow-up work extended
this finding by examining naturally occurring differences in
the expectations of their sample of Responders. By taking the
deviations between the actual offer and their participants’ prior
expectations into account, this substantially better explained
decision-making than an inequity aversion account alone (Chang
and Sanfey, 2013). These studies demonstrate that players do
possess prior knowledge about the type of offers they will likely
receive, and importantly, that they use this knowledge of an
“average” offer in their subsequent decision-making. Similarly,
by altering the average offer from the first half to second half
of the experiment, there is evidence of a trial-by-trial reward
prediction error, indicating that people track offers and update
their expectations based on their prior experience (Xiang et al.,
2013). Therefore, it appears that players in the Ultimatum Game
have a good awareness of the average offer they can expect,
either via experimentally-handed down declarative knowledge,
or via their own understanding of the appropriate social norm
of fairness, and that this average offer weighs heavily in their
accept/reject decisions.
Outside the domain of fairness-related choice, expectations
also play a crucial role in financial decisions. For risky financial
decisions such as portfolio management, a crucial aspect of the
decision-making process is the expected distribution of payoffs.
In fact, a common definition of risk is the variance of payoffs
around the mean (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970; Levy and Levy,
2004). Interestingly, higher-order distributional moments like
skew and kurtosis also play a role in risky decision-making
(Noussair et al., 2014), suggesting that people evaluate the
payoff of risky outcomes by comparing them to the expected
distribution of outcomes, not simply the mean or variance.
Importantly, many computational formulations (e.g., Bayesian
learner) and the associated neural regions (e.g., anterior Insula)
seem to be the domain-general, i.e., appertain to risk-taking
and social decision making, hinting at the possibility of a
common processes for evaluating choice options in light of one’s
expectations of payoffs. An intriguing possibility therefore is
that the social expectations participants both form and use in
the Ultimatum Game also may be comprised of more than just
the average of the expected set of offers. Indeed, previous work
found evidence of a neural variance prediction error, indicating
that participants also track how strongly offers vary across a set
(Xiang et al., 2013). Though this study did not manipulate both
mean and variance independently, this suggests that Responders
compare the current offer to the distribution of offers they
expect.
In this study, we extended this previous work on expectations
in the UG by explicitly investigating whether Responders take
into account not only themean expected offer, as has been shown,
but also the particular distribution of the offers. Specifically, in a
novel within-subject design (trial structure shown in Figure 1)
we manipulated participants’ a priori expectations of upcoming
offers along two dimensions, the mean and the variance of the
distribution of offer: We provided participants with histograms
of offers given by the current group of Proposers in a previous
experiments. In line with previous studies, we hypothesized that
expecting different offers on average would lead to different
rejection rates for unfair offers. Additionally, we hypothesized
that the variance of offers might have a modulatory effect on
this relationship, such that Responders might be less responsive
to deviations from the mean expected offer when coming from
a high variance set. Finally, we explored whether participants’
initial beliefs, that is, what participants expect prior to playing
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FIGURE 1 | Task structure. (A) Time-line of UG task. The four conditions are organized into a mini-block design, where every five rounds a new group of Proposers
(i.e., one of the conditions) is randomly picked. At the beginning of each mini-block, the upcoming group is introduced by color and the distribution of offers these
Proposers purportedly gave in a previous experiment (i.e., the expectation manipulation). Then participants play five rounds of the UG with five different Proposers
from that group with a pot-size of AC20. Then, a new mini-block starts by introducing the next group. (B) The four groups participants encountered during the task.
Importantly, the depicted distributions vary across two dimensions, namely mean and variance, leading to a 2× 2 within-subject design for the expectations of offers.
the UG and receiving any specific information on the upcoming
groups, also affected their accept/reject decisions.
2. METHOD
2.1. Subjects
A total of 62 participants (83 % female, mean age = 22.2
years) completed the study for either course credit or payment
(AC10). Participants also received a bonus based on their actual
performance—a round of the Ultimatum Game (UG) was
randomly chosen at the end of the experiment and their
monetary outcome was paid out as a bonus to ensure that
participants made real decisions (maximum AC10). The study
protocol was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO
region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the general
ethic approval (CMO 2014/288), and all the experimental
methods were conducted in accordance with these guidelines. All
participants provided written informed consent in accordance
Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of local ethics
committee.
2.2. Initial Belief Elicitation
After participants familiarized themselves with the rules of the
UG, we elicited participants’ a priori beliefs about the kind
of offers they expected to encounter: For a total pot amount
of AC20, participants were asked to estimate how many of 100
Proposers would offer AC0,AC1,AC2,AC3, · · ·AC18,AC19,AC20. They
also indicated what kind of offer they would make themselves.
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2.3. Ultimatum Game & Expectation
Induction
During the UG, participants purportedly played with players
from four different groups. Participants were told that the
proposers provided offers as part of a previous experiment and
would be paid out if participants were to accept their offer and
that trial was selected for pay-out. Participants were told that
“from previous experiments we know that some groups of people
give a lot, while others give a little. Youwill be playing with people
from four different groups. To give you an idea what kind of
player you are being paired up with, we will provide you with
information about how much these people offered in a previous
experiment”. In addition, participants were told that proposers’
offers for the current experiment were prerecorded, and would be
paid out if participants were to accept their offer and that trial was
selected for pay-out. To manipulate participants’ expectations,
each group was described with a single histogram representing
the prior offers of that group (Figure 1). Crucially, the histograms
differed on two dimensions: the mean (low/high) and the
variance (low/high) of the depicted distribution, leading to a 2×2
design. To ensure that participants could interpret the histograms
accurately, they were extensively instructed beforehand as to
how the histograms were constructed from a set of offers; the
distributions were constructed to be slightly asymmetric, as
piloting revealed that symmetric distributions were somewhat
unrealistic to participants (full instruction material available, see
section Data Availability).
Participants played 180 rounds of the UG (45 rounds per
condition), each round with a new, unique partner. All UG
rounds involved splitting a pot of AC20. The offers participants
received in each of the four conditions only partially matched
the depicted distribution of offers: 30 offers were used to
create the histograms and, hence, were a perfect match; to
expose participants also to some offers not present in the
depicted distributions (i.e., deviations from expectations), the
remaining 15 offers where drawn uniformly from the set
{AC1;AC3;AC5;AC7;AC9}. This design was chosen as a compromise
between two extremes: One the one hand, if the offer sets were
identical across all conditions, it is possible that participants
would learn to ignore the histograms by tracking offers and
learning that the histograms are unrelated to the actual offer
set. On the other hand, if the offer sets matched the histograms
perfectly, offers would not deviate from expectations, and
hence we would be unable to assess whether deviations from
expectations matter. Although this led to an unbalanced design
in offer sets across the four conditions, we used these partially
matching sets of offers as a trade-off between these two opposing
goals.
To further decrease the chance that participants would
track the actual set of offers and learn that the histograms
are only partially predictive, we shuﬄed the conditions in a
“mini-block” design: Every five trials, one group was randomly
chosen, indicated by a screen showing the upcoming group and
the associated histogram. This screen also explicitly indicated
the mean of that distribution. Then participants played five
rounds of the UG with Proposers from this group, before
another random group selection was made. Each offer screen
also depicted the histogram and indicated the current offer
using an arrow (see Figure 1A). This made the relationship
of current offer and histogram as salient as possible, and
removed any need to keep the distribution in working memory.
After participants finished the UG, they were debriefed and
paid.
2.4. Data Analyses
All behavioral statistics were computed using R statistical package
(R Core Team, 2017).
We conducted two complementary sets of analyses. First,
we modeled the choice data of all participants who rejected
at least one offer (N = 55) and estimated population
effects using a logistic mixed model; second, we classified
each participant as following one of three possible choice-
models: pure self-interest, inequity-aversion, or the expectation
model.
Specifically, we first fitted a logistic mixed model estimating
the probability to accept or reject (dependent variable) at
each round of the UG. Predictor variables included the offer
amount, mean-condition (low vs. high), variance-condition
(low vs. high), and all their interactions as fixed effects, and
participant as the only random intercept to account for the
repeated-measures structure of the data. We centered the offer
amount (mean offer AC5.33) before estimating the mixed models
using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) to make the fitting process
more numerically stable, as suggested in the documentation of
lme4. To determine p values, we computed Type 3 Likelihood
Ratio Tests as implemented in the mixed function of the
package afex (Singmann et al., 2018). We also tried to include
random slopes as suggest previously (Barr et al., 2013), but
the model did not converge so we report the intercept-only
model.
To account for participants’ initial beliefs during the UG,
for each participant we calculated the mean of the elicited
distribution, which quantifies the average offer each participant
expects, as well as the standard deviation, which quantifies
beliefs about how much the offer amount might vary. We mean-
centered both of these variables (again, for more stable estimation
using the lme4 package) before adding them as fixed effects to a
second mixed-model of the UG decisions.
To gain a more qualitative sense of how prevalent different
behaviors are, we classified each participant’s behavior as pure-
self interest (when they accepted all offers), or as either being
motivated by inequity-aversion or expectation-deviation. To
achieve this, we estimated two logistic regression models for
each participant who rejected at least one offer: The simpler
model included only offer amount and an intercept as predictors.
This model is a simple reparametrized version of the inequity-
aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as no hyperfair
(i.e., above half the pot amount) offers were present in our
experiment. The second model included predictors indicating
the expectations at each trial, namely the mean-condition and
variance-condition, as well as all interactions (including with
the offer amount), i.e., six additional parameters, which is
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a reparametrized version of the expectation model, without
restricting the direction of the effect of expectations. We assessed
whether the more complex expectation model significantly
improved the model fit using the Likelihood Ratio Test. This
is a rather conservative test, because the two models differ by
six parameters, requiring a substantial improvement in model-
fit (difference in deviances > 12.59) so that a participant’s
choice-pattern is classified as adhering to the expectation
model.
For supplementary analyses of the reaction times, see
supplementary materials (Supplementary Data Sheet 1).
2.5. Data Availability
Data, experimental materials including the instruction materials
and analyses are available from the Donders Institute for Brain,
Cognition and Behavior repository at (see http://hdl.handle.net/
11633/di.dccn.DSC_3014030.01_615).
3. RESULTS
In the UG, as expected, participants rejected low offers more
often than high offers [main effect of the centered offer amount,
Estimate = 2.01(0.05), OR = 7.45, χ2
(1)
= 5901.3,
p < 2.210−16]. In addition to this canonical observation, our
expectation manipulation also influenced participants’ decisions:
When expecting low offers, participants were more likely to
accept all offers [main effect of mean-condition, Estimate =
−0.88(0.06), OR = 0.17, χ2
(1)
= 236.5, p = 5.3 ∗ 10−5].
Additionally, the variability of the expected offers impacted how
strongly participants’ decisions were affected by the offer amount
[interaction effect of variance and offer-amount, Estimate =
−0.14(0.04), OR = 0.75, χ2
(1)
= 16.33, p = 0.013; three-
way interaction of offer amount, variance-condition, and mean-
condition, Estimate = −0.09(0.04), OR = 0.70, χ2
(1)
= 6.227,
p = 0.01] such that participants rejected fewer low offers
when they expected high variability as compared to when they
expected more consistency across, and more so when expecting
the average offer to be high (fitting the same model logistic mixed
model to the low and high mean conditions separately shows
that the interaction of offer-amount with the variance reaches
significance only in the high mean conditions). Together, these
effects indicate that participants were more likely to accept low
offers of AC3 when they were expecting low offers, and when
they expected offers to vary to a greater extent (see Figure 2).
No other effects were significant. When performing the above
analyses on subsets of the data one for the high mean and one
for the low mean conditions—we see the following pattern: in
the high mean conditions, there is a significant effect of variance
[Estimate = −0.20(0.05); OR = 0.66; χ2
(1)
= 19.85; p < 0.10−5];
in the low mean conditions, this effect is not significant although
in the same direction [Estimate = −0.063(0.05); OR = 0.88;
χ
2
(1)
= 1.43; p = 0.225].
Before playing the UG and receiving any of information
on the upcoming group of Proposers, participants indicated
their initial beliefs about what distribution of offers they expect.
The between-subject mean of these initial beliefs are shown in
Figure 3A. On average, participants expected an offer of AC8.5
from a AC20 pot. If the elicited belief distributions differ across
participants, then the impact of these initial beliefs on the UG
decisions can be quantified. To summarize each participant’s
initial beliefs, we calculated the mean and standard deviation
of the belief distribution. The between-subjects variability of the
mean of the belief distribution and the standard deviation of the
belief distribution is shown in Figure 3B. The variance of each
of these aspects (s.d. of mean of initial beliefs smean = AC2.19,
standard deviation of standard deviation of initial beliefs
ss.d. = AC1.09) as well as their negligible correlation (r =
0.008) suggest that we can include both of these variables into the
mixed-model.
To assess the influence of the initial beliefs on their decisions
in the UG, we first added the centered mean and centered
FIGURE 2 | Decision in the Ultimatum Game. (A) Between-subject mean probability to accept an offer in the UG. Even without leveraging the within-subject design, it
is evident that the mean expected offer substantially changes how likely one is to accept unfair offers (e.g., AC5 out of a AC20 pot-size). In addition, especially low offers
(≤ AC3) are accepted more frequently in the high-variance conditions as compared to the respective low-variance conditions. (B) The difference in utilities to accept vs.
reject a certain offer, as implied by the fitted logistic mixed-model. The effect of mean expected offers is captured by the intercept, whereas the variance changes the
slope, which is mostly driven by the difference in slopes in the high-mean conditions.
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FIGURE 3 | Initial beliefs. Before playing the Ultimatum Game and receiving
any information on the groups participants would encounter during the
experiment, we elicited for each participant their initial beliefs about how likely
they would encounter each possible offer amount. (A) Between-subject
distribution of initial beliefs. (B) Between-subject variability in mean and
standard-deviation of the initial belief distribution of each participant. The
substantial variability in these two aspects of the initial beliefs (as well as their
low correlation of r = 0.008) allows as to quantify their influence on the UG
decisions.
standard deviation of the initial expected offers as fixed effects,
without adding any interaction-terms, which is analogous to
performing an ANCOVA-like analysis for logistic regression, i.e.,
“controlling for” these two variables. This did not change any
of the aforementioned significant effects, and the fixed effects
of mean and variance of initial expectation were not significant.
However, when including all higher-order interactions with
offer-amount, mean-condition, and variance-condition, we
found additional significant effects. Specifically, this revealed an
additional significant interaction between the mean and variance
manipulations [Estimate = 0.12(0.06), OR = 1.62, χ2
(1)
= 3.95,
p = 0.047] which qualifies the aforementioned effect of the
mean-condition in such a way that participants accepted all offers
more often when they expected to get low offers, but this effect
was stronger when they did not expect the offers to vary much.
Interestingly, we also found that differences in initial beliefs
were related to the magnitude of the effect-sizes for of the
effects described above: The mean of the initial beliefs showed
significant interactions with the offer amount [Estimate =
−0.24(0.03), OR = 0.79, χ2
(1)
= 58.0, p < 10−4] and
mean-condition [Estimate = 0.13(0.04), OR = 1.30, χ2
(1)
=
11.5, p = 0.0007], and the three-way interaction with offer
amount and variance-condition [Estimate = 0.05(0.02), OR =
1.11, χ2
(1)
= 4.45, p = 0.035]. Importantly, these interactions
are modulations of effects described above—without taking the
initial beliefs into account—and the direction of the interactions
is consistently such that the magnitude of the effects decreases for
participants who had an initial belief of receiving high offers. The
standard deviations of the initial beliefs also showed significant
interaction effects, namely, with offer amount [Estimate =
−0.34(0.04), OR = 0.71, χ2
(1)
= 54.3, p < 10−4], mean-
condition [Estimate = 0.42(0.06), OR = 2.32, χ2
(1)
= 56.2, p <
10−4], variance-condition [Estimate = 0.11(0.05), OR = 1.25,
χ
2
(1)
= 4.42, p = 0.036]. Finally, there were also interaction
effects between mean and variance of prior expected offers and
the manipulations: the three-way interaction with offer-amount
[Estimate = 0.08(0.02), OR = 1.08, χ2
(1)
= 24.94, p <
10−4], the 3-way interaction with mean-condition [Estimate =
−0.07(0.02), OR = 0.87, χ2
(1)
= 10.16, p = 0.0014].
More qualitatively, we found that 11% (7/62) of the
participants in our sample accepted all offers—in line with
a standard economic model of pure self-interest—while the
majority of participants reject at least some offers. Crucially, 50%
(31/62) of the participants were classified as clearly following
the expectation model, while only 39% (24/62) seemed not to
take expectations into account above chance level, in line with
a simpler inequity-aversion motivation.
4. DISCUSSION
In this study, we explored how expectations about upcoming
offers in the Ultimatum Game affected participants’ decisions to
either accept or reject a given offer. In a novel within-subject
design, we provided participants with differing expectations
about sets of upcoming offer amounts by showing four different
histograms, each depicting the distribution of offers that a
particular group had previously made in a prior experimental
setting. Across these four distributions of offers, we manipulated
both the mean, and the variance of the respective offer set.
Participants in our study were therefore provided with four
different sets of expectations—highmean offer with low variance,
high mean offer with high variance, low mean offer with low
variance, and lowmean offer with high variance. Importantly, the
provision of these expectations should theoretically not actually
impact the participants’ decision, as all relevant information
is provided in the actual offer itself. That is, what has been
“expected” is, or should be, largely irrelevant to the decision
to accept or reject a particular monetary offer. Nonetheless,
we clearly demonstrated that both mean and variance of
the depicted distributions impacted participants’ Ultimatum
Game choices, underlining, and extending, the importance
of expectations in social decision-making. Crucially, the two
aspects of the distributions that were experimentally manipulated
had a different effect on the accept/reject decisions. Expecting
high offers decreased the likelihood of accepting offers, while
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 July 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 992
Vavra et al. Expectations in the Ultimatum Game
expecting greater variation in offers increased the likelihood
of accepting offers, low offers in particular. When controlling
for participants initial beliefs, we also found that in the high
variance conditions people were willing to accept lower offers
more often than in the low variance conditions, especially
when expecting high offers. Therefore, these results show that
expecting a certain type of offer impacts decision-making.
Importantly, we extend knowledge about how expectations can
alter choice by showing that both the mean and the variance
of those expectations plays an important role in decision-
making.
To gain a more complete understanding as to how
expectations impact our social choices, we also elicited
participants’ initial beliefs about the offers they might see in
the game, prior to the experiment and thus before seeing any
of the histograms. Participants differed in both the offers they
initially believed they might receive, as well as how varied
a set of offers would likely be. We found that participants
who had relatively high initial beliefs about offer amounts and
were, thus, presumably disappointed by the set of relatively
unfair offers actually encountered during the experiment, then
rejected low offers more often. However, if they also believed
that Proposers would vary more in their offers this effect
was smaller, in that they accepted low offers more often.
Importantly, this pattern is consistent with the effects of the
handed-down expectations. Although these initial beliefs were
not the focus of the present study, we believe that many factors
influencing participants’ accept/reject decisions can potentially
be accounted for by changes in people’s expectations. For
example, the finding that Proposers offer less (in relative terms)
and Responders more often accept these smaller offers when
the stakes are large (Andersen et al., 2011) might be due
to both players having different expectations of what kind
offers are likely to be given (namely lower ones). Therefore,
we believe a fruitful avenue for future research is to study
which factors influence participants initial beliefs about the kind
of offers they are likely to receive. Importantly, our results
suggest that these investigations should go beyond simply asking
participants what kind of “average” offer they expect to see
and instead elicit a full distribution of the likelihood of all
offers.
Interestingly, we also found interaction effects between
participants’ initial beliefs and the expectations that were handed
down in the course of the experiment. We did not have
specific hypotheses for these interactions, so these analyses
were exploratory. Nonetheless, we would like to highlight that
almost all significant interactions of the initial beliefs and the
expectations involved the effects of our manipulations described
above—without accounting for the initial beliefs. This suggests
that participants built up subjective expectations based on
both their initial beliefs and the information provided prior
to the trials, and then used these subjective expectations as
the basis for their accept/reject decisions. The exact nature
of how these different expectations are integrated into one
coherent expected distribution of offers is an interesting
question for future research and beyond the scope this
study. One possibility is a Bayes-rule-like updating, where the
initial belief forms a prior, the handed-down expectations the
likelihood, and the resulting subjective expectations would be
the posterior distribution of the offers, similar to the trial-
by-trial updating of expectations shown before (Xiang et al.,
2013).
Importantly, the results outlined here are difficult to account
for via the standard inequity aversionmodel, which proposes that
decisions to reject low amounts are driven by comparing the
current offer to the equitable state of receiving half of the pot
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002). While half of our participants either
accepted all offers or appeared to conform to the aforementioned
inequity aversion predictions, the other half clearly exhibited
behavior that could not be accounted for by either a purely self-
interested or an inequity averse strategy: these set of participants’
behavior was well accounted for by an expectation account.
More specifically, the Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion model
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) specifies that any deviation from
an equal split will be a source of disutility, and as such does
not accommodate changes in this level of disutility due to
different expectations. While of course the inequity aversion
model could be modified by adding a new expectation parameter
to define what “equity” is, changing the model in this way
also changes its fundamental nature. This is because we believe
the underlying psychological mechanism is markedly different
between the two accounts. An intrinsic assumption of the
inequity aversion model is that there is one fair allocation of
resources, given certain inputs by the different players (namely
a proportional one). In the case of a standard Ultimatum Game,
these inputs are equal and thus an equal split of the money is
the equitable and fair allocation. However, when expectations
are taken into account, a different notion of what is fair is
possible: People evaluate a given allocation by comparing it to
their expectations (Chang and Sanfey, 2013; Sanfey et al., 2014).
If, with identical inputs, two different contexts are associated
with different expectations (e.g., because of what happened
before in those contexts, as in our case), there will be different
notions of what is fair. Put differently, there is no single fair
allocation, when considering only inputs and outputs; instead
fairness depends on the context and other “variables” which go
beyond a simple balance of inputs and outputs. Our findings
replicate, and extend, recent research demonstrating that prior
expectations can impact player’s decisions, often in surprisingly
strong ways.
The current study extends the expectations model by
demonstrating that, in addition to themean amount, the variance
of the expected set of offers impacts decisions: expectations of
the variance of an offer set changes how strongly any deviation
from expectations is weighted. There are two different ways this
effect of variance can be interpreted. One is that the expected
variance of the offer set could signal certainty about one’s
expectation. This is in a similar vein to perceptual decision-
making (e.g., Pouget et al., 2013) where variance is a result
of noise around the stimulus and therefore makes estimation
of the mean (true) signal more difficult. Accordingly, when
a group of people behave in a heterogeneous manner, it is
naturally more difficult to learn the average behavior of that
group. However, given that no learning was necessary in our
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experimental design, as participants explicitly observed the entire
distribution of offers in a histogram format, this explanation is,
we believe, less likely. Unlike the perceptual process, the average
offer here does not necessarily represent the “true” behavior
of a particular group—people may simply vary in how they
behave.
A second, and more intriguing, possibility is that social
expectations are complex entities that consist, amongst other
things, of distributional information such as how homogeneously
a group behaves. Indeed, in everyday life, we can imagine
situations with different associated expectations. In one situation
we might expect to be treated nicely by everyone, whereas
in other situations we might expect people to behave more
variable, some being nice, some not so much. We can also
imagine situations where we would expect most people to be
nice, but occasionally encountering a few “bad apples.” From
this perspective, we may not just hold expectations about the
average or most likely behavior, but we may also explicitly track
higher order features of that distribution, such as variability
(homogeneity of a group) and skew (bad apples). Indeed, when
comparing initial beliefs across different participants, the average
offer participants initially thought they would encounter did
not correlate with their belief about how much people might
vary. Based on this interpretation, one prediction therefore is
that higher moments of the distribution, such as skew and
kurtosis, are also being taken into account when evaluating the
offer at hand in the Ultimatum Game. If this is the case, the
decision to accept or reject an offer may have similarities to
risky decision-making where higher-order moments have been
shown to play a role (Noussair et al., 2014). It is worthwhile
pointing out, however, that in contrast to risky decision-making
where variance in expectations is due to the probabilistic nature
of the outcomes (e.g., a sure option of AC5 vs. a 50/50 chance
of winning AC10 or receiving nothing), the decision to accept
or reject in the UG is of course not probabilistic: participants
know with complete certainty the consequences of both choice
options.
Although the focus of our experiment was to compare the
inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) model with the
expectation-deviation model (Chang and Sanfey, 2013; Battigalli
et al., 2015), there are several mechanisms proposed to underly
the rejection of low offers. These views are typically seen as
falling into two camps (see e.g., Karagonlar and Kuhlman,
2013). On the one hand, people are proposed as altruistically
punishing low offers to enforce a social fairness norm (Rabin,
1993; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
Indeed, people are willing to sacrifice their own money even if
they are not the target of the unfairness (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004). On the other hand, the low offer itself can be seen as
an insult by the responder—the proposer would give a low
offer only if they believe the responder is likely to accept
it—causing a negative emotional response. This more self-
centered emotional response, in turn, could drive the ensuing
rejection(Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). In fact, people are
willing to reject unfair offers even in variants of the game
where such a decision does not affect the outcomes of the
proposer (Impunity Game) (Yamagishi et al., 2009)—likely
ruling out a motivation to enforce a social norm. Instead,
people seem to want to send a message: they do not want
to be part of an unfair interaction. From the perspective
of the expectation-deviation model, however, these views are
not necessarily opposing: the average expected offer indicates
a context-dependent social norm and any offer below that
will cause a negative emotional response. This will be the
case independently of who the target of the allocation is,
accounting for rejections of unfair offers on behalf of others;
once there is a deviation, people are likely to reject these low
offers to feel better, explaining why people reject offers even
in the Impunity Game. Previous research has suggested that
individual differences like social value orientation affect how
strong the emotional response to an unfair offer is, leading
to differences in rejection rates independent of the mean
expected offer—even when people rate the low offers as equally
unfair, suggesting they differ in how strictly they apply social
norms (Karagonlar and Kuhlman, 2013). The results of our
experiment add to this view by highlighting that another aspect of
expectations, namely the expected variability of offers, influences
how strict the current social norm is in a context-dependent
manner.
The Ultimatum Game has been widely used to investigate
people’s evaluation of, and response to, fairness. Here, we
demonstrated that the fundamental decision as to whether a
certain allocation of money is evaluated as either acceptably
fair or not depends to an important degree on people’s prior
expectations of what kind of offer they will receive. We show
that different aspects of these expectations affects assessment
of fairness in different ways: expecting higher offers raises the
bar for what is acceptable, while expecting high variability leads
to greater flexibility in applying a criterion of fairness. Overall,
this is consistent with the possibility that social expectations are
complex entities, consisting of distributional information about
how likely one is to encounter different types of behavior from
interaction partners, and that these set of expectations form the
basis of our fairness judgments.
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